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This paper has two aims. First, it studies the way the Austrian theory of institutions 
evolved from the main works of Menger. Second, and most significantly, it tries to 
justify the idea that the economic analysis of institutions was inspired more or less 
explicitly by Menger’s thesis but more generally by the Austrian intuitions and thesis. 
These intuitions and theses are however amended in order to make them more 
formalized as well as testable.  
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Introduction. 
The specificity of the Austrian tradition regarding the analysis of institutions is 
based on the manner in which it was developed by Menger, in 1871 then in 1883 and 
1892. In 1871, Menger took an interest in the emergence of money, throughout chapter 
VIII of the Principles. He started with the idea that originally trade was carried out in 
the form of a direct barter between individuals. He believed that the direct barter would 
be quite costly since each potential trader would need to know the individual he would 
be trading
1 with and would therefore have to find this individual prior to the trade. It 
would also be costly due to the fact that the prices may vary in time and space
2. He 
therefore considered it to be more efficient, since it was less costly (search costs and 
loss of value), for an individual, to proceed with a indirect barter instead of a direct 
barter, in other words, he would trade his goods for another that would be more tradable 
(in other words, goods that would be more available and for which the risk of loss of 
value would be more reliable)
3 . Based on this idea, Menger put forth a first hypothesis 
that a restricted number of individuals
4, supporting this reasoning, tried to supply 
themselves with goods that were more tradable than the others. They therefore obtained 
a higher gain than those who did not act according to this reasoning. The second 
hypothesis that Menger introduced was that the other individuals would see that the 
individuals in question were obtaining higher revenues and in turn would imitate their 
behaviour
5. They would therefore trade their goods for more tradable goods, and 
accordingly as the goods would be traded more often, they would then become more 
tradable. This phenomenon would progressively result in the selection of a single 
product that would be more tradable than all others: money. This very simple reasoning, 
since it was founded on two hypotheses (Vanberg, 1996) allowed Menger to show how 
                                                 
1 “Think, indeed, of the peculiar difficulties obstructing the immediate barter of goods in those cases, 
where supply and demand do not quantitatively coincide.” (Menger, 1892, p. 242). It is in fact the same 
problem as that considered in the “double coincidence of demands” of Jevons.  
2 “The price at which any given individual can at pleasure buy a commodity at a given market and at a 
given point in time, and the price at which he can dispose of the same commodity at pleasure, are two 
essentially different magnitudes.” (Menger, 1892, p. 243). 
3 “A commodity is more or less saleable according to how we are able, with a more or less prospect of 
success, to dispose of it at prices corresponding to the general economic situation, at economic prices.” 
(Menger, 1892, p. 245). 
4 “It is only in the first instance that a limited number of economic subjects will recognize the advantage 
of such a procedure.” (Menger, 1892, p. 249). 
5 “There is no better method of enlightening someone concerning his economic interests than if he 
perceives the economic success of those who use the right means to secure their own.” (Menger, 1892, p. 
249).   2
the organic institutions emerged, in other words, institutions that are not the result of 
one individual’s will, nor the realization of a collective objective, contrary to pragmatic 
institutions that are the result of an individual or group of individuals realizing an 
intentional goal. It is important for this discussion that we clarify that, for Menger, 
organic institutions, on the one hand, are suited to satisfy the common well-being and, 
on the other hand, the pragmatic institutions do not compare to the organic institutions 
since they do not come under the same level of analysis
6. It is also necessary to 
distinguish between the “spontaneous” emergence of organic institutions and the 
efficiency of an intervention on their evolution (the role of the State in setting and 
protecting the value of the money was essential for Menger. We will see the importance 
of this question later). 
In this contribution we will develop two points. On the one hand, we will study 
the manner in which the Austrian theory developed from Menger’s theses as we have 
just briefly mentioned
7. On the other hand, and above all we will try to justify the idea 
that the economic analysis of institutions is partly inspired, more or less explicitly, from 
Menger’s theses and more generally the Austrian theses, and are amended to make the 
propositions more testable. 
 
                                                 
6 If the analysis of organic institutions comes under “the exact orientation of economic research”, the 
analysis of pragmatic institutions refers to “an empirical realist approach”. Concerning this point cf. 
Vanberg (1996) and Garrouste (1994a). 
7 For a more complete analysis of Menger’s theses regarding the emergence of money, cf. O’Driscoll 
(1986), Garrouste (1994a) and Alvarez (2001).   3
1. Developments regarding the Austrian theory of institutions. 
In this section we will not go into detail concerning all the different aspects of 
the Austrian approach of institutions. We will present only 1) the fact that certain 
specificities and internal fault lines of the Austrian tradition in the sense that they seem 
important when we consider the non Austrian developments regarding the economic 
analysis of institutions and 2) the main contributions of the “Austrian” authors in the 
area of institutional analysis.  
 
1.1. Specificity and heterogeneity of Austrian contributions. 
We will present the following elements: the first will be methodological. This 
seems important since it impacts the two others. The second element will concern the 
hypotheses made regarding the individual’s behaviour and the third concerns the 
problem of efficiency of the institutions. 
 
1.1.1. Some methodological aspects of the Austrian tradition. 
  Menger (1883) is considered to have developed an Aristotelian approach 
(Kauder, 1957, Parsons, 1990, Dufourt, Garrouste, 1993) to the scientific activity in 
economics (he speaks of an “exact orientation of economic research”). He considers, 
apart from the German Historical School (it would be the beginning of a “dispute over 
the methods”) that it is possible to highlight exact laws, in other words for him, 
universal since they constitute synthetic propositions a priori. Due to this fact, the 
principles that guide the scientific explanation are valid as much in economics as in law, 
politics, exact sciences and social sciences because they support the idea of 
methodological monism. This vision is shared by a certain number of contemporary 
“Austrians” (Mises, 1966, Rothbard, 1957, Selgin, 1988), sometimes with subtleties (for 
example, as is the case of the Mengerian monism) that we will not elaborate on at this 
time
8. Conversely, Hayek, for example, does not share this same conception
9. He 
believes on the one hand, that there exists a difference in nature between the physical 
reality and the social reality and that the latter is much too complex to be analysed using 
methods also used to study the first element. On the second hand, economic theories 
                                                 
8 Cf. for example Selgin (1988) Dufourt, Garrouste (1993) 
9 Cf. Selgin (1988) Dufourt, Garrouste (1993)   4
must propose refutable
10 conclusions (empirically or theoretically). In addition, for 
Lachmann
11 for example, we arrive at an essential non-determination of the result of 
individual’s action, because we are unable to show neither the rational character of the 
result nor anticipate this a fortiori result (in accordance with that of Hayek)
12. This 
would naturally render the efficient character of the institutions debatable, among other 
things, as we will see later. In fact, if the individual’s behaviour is determined by the 
expectations they have regarding the behaviour of others and if these expectations are 
incorrect, then we may defend the idea that a radical uncertainty exists and the kalideic 
conception of Lachmann and Shackle is justified, except for the consideration of the 
existence of a Deus ex Machina intervention to render these expectations compatible. 
A second important aspect of the methodological basis of the Austrian analysis 
of institutions resides in a subjective point of view that it develops. The Austrian 
tradition, often on a rather diverging basis, supports the idea that there is a fundamental 
heterogeneity in individuals.  The idea put forth is that the value of the goods is based 
on the satisfaction that each individual gets or hopes to get and not the objective 
characteristics of the goods themselves. The value of a product is therefore subjective in 
the sense that it is specific to each individual. For the supporters of the “praxeological” 
approach (Mises, 1966, Selgin, 1988) to the Austrian conception, the concept of stable 
preferences is not pertinent in itself since if the preference is revealed by a rational 
action (praxeological category), it does not constitute a praxeological category and 
therefore does not exist a priori. 
The third important element of the Austrian conception of institutions resides in 
the role it attributes to time. This idea has led to numerous theoretical productions 
regarding equity and capital theories or regarding the analysis of economic fluctuations 
(Hayek, 1931). Economic analysis has for some time already integrated this important 
element. However the Austrians have their own particular conception of time. They 
oppose real time to what they call a Newtonian time (O’Dirscoll, Rizzo, 1984)
13.  
                                                 
10 Cf. Hutchison (1981) or Aimar (2001). This position is however the object of a debate among the 
supporters of the Austrian tradition.  
11 Cf. Gloria-Palermo (1999) 
12 For an analysis of the differences between Hayek and Lachmann, cf. Aimar (1999) and Gloria-Palermo 
(1999). 
13 According to O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1984) Hayek supports the notion of analytical time therefore 
Newtonian.   5
The notion, also put for the by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971) regarding the 
distinction between mechanical time and thermodynamic time, has its origin in the 
distinction made by Bergson between time and duration. For the Austrians, real time is 
synonymous with duration and cannot be measured in the same manner as Newtonian 
time. It goes without saying that this is one of the hard cores of the Austrian program 
that poses the most problems when we want to produce a formal model since time must 
be indexed to take into account the fact that it differs according to the individual.  
Finally, the last element, according to Menger
14, the Austrians are generally and 
often for different reasons
15, hesitant to use mathematic formalism. This refusal is 
however the subject of a debate within the community of Austrian economists. 
 
1.1.2. The individual’s behaviour. 
The Austrian analysis of individual behaviour may not be distinguished from the 
dual notion of subjectivism and temporality. This leads to the conclusion that on the one 
hand, individuals are heterogeneous and do not have the same type of behaviour and on 
the other hand that they live in a radically uncertain
16 world. The one person, among 
Austrian authors, who proposed the most influential conception regarding individual 
behaviour is indisputably Hayek in The Sensory Order (1952)
17. This analysis is based 
on the distinction between information and knowledge
18. The subjectivity of individual 
knowledge finds its foundation, with Hayek, in the explanation he gives regarding the 
construction of the mind
19. He has a connectionist conception, inasmuch as he considers 
that the neurons are grouped into maps constituting links between the physical world 
and the sensory world and that the mind emerges from the complexity of these 
connections. A mental representation is therefore characterized by a nervous excitement 
                                                 
14 Cf. Garrouste (1994b). 
15 For example if Lachmann (1986) and Shackle (1972) justify this by the incompatibility between 
subjectivism and formalism. Menger considers mathematics as a means of exposure but not as a means 
that would allow access to the essence of economical phenomenon. 
16 For a certain number of aspects see Selgin (1988). 
17 Edelman therefore writes; “I must say that I have been deeply gratified by reading a book (Hayek’s The 
Sensory Order) of which I have been aware when I wrote my little essay on group selection theory… I 
recommend this book to your attention, as an exercise in profound thinking by a man who simply 
considers knowledge for its own sake.” (Edelman, 1982, p. 24). In Edelman (1989), we also find 
proximities with the Hayekian theses. 
18 “Many economists have professed to analyze information; relatively few have considered carefully the 
problem of knowledge. Among those who have, Hayek is pre-eminent.” (Loasby, B.J., 1989, p. 38). See 
also Lachmann (1986, p. 43 and after). 
19 Cf. Rizzelo (1999).   6
within the neuronal structure. This is caused neither by the nature of the stimuli, nor by 
the transmitting impulse. (Hayek, 1952, p.12). It is as though the complexity of the 
cerebral “syntax” produces a “semantic”. Therefore, “what we refer to as knowledge is 
mainly a system for rules of action supported and modified by rules indicating 
similarities and differences between combinations of stimuli”. (Hayek, 1978, p. 41). 
Action patterns allow the individuals to act and a process of selection of production 
mechanisms of these action patterns is implemented. Individuals understand each other 
since they are equipped with similar systems for production and selection of action 
patterns. Therefore in a given context we understand the actions of others “that may be 
physically different and we are unable to make a comprehensive list but that we know 
“signify” the same thing”. (Hayek, 1980, p.62). Based on this system of abstract rules, 
individuals have different experiences and these experiences determine their conception 
of the world. In fact, each new conception is linked to a process of classification into 
categories. If no past experience corresponds to this new information, therefore, either 
the information has not been compared or a process of “recombination” is necessary to 
permit classification. This process explains the fact that conceptions are subjective since 
they are linked to the entire history of an individual’s confrontations with a changing 
environment
20. These processes are abstract, according to Hayek, and in other words for 
him they are not conscious (in the sense of meta-conscience), we are unable to 
communicate the information or the results, which portrays a large part of our 
knowledge as being something idiosyncratic and therefore non communicable (Hayek, 
1980). Here, the Hayekian version of subjectivism explains that the analysis of the 
coordination of individual actions is the main problem for economists supporting the 
Austrian tradition (O’Driscoll, 1977, Lachmann, 1986). 
 
1.1.3. The problem of efficiency of the institutions. 
For Menger, an organic institution possesses the characteristic of being optimal 
in the sense that it satisfies the well-being of everyone. This result is surprising a priori 
(especially during the period that his work was written) because individuals who choose 
a tradable product may not make the best possible, or optimal choice. In other words, 
                                                 
20 This is why it is possible for Caldwell to write: “though the structure of our minds are the same, there is 
a physiological basis for the notion of a dispersion of perceptions and experiences and, ultimately, of 
knowledge.” (Cladwell, 1997, p. 1874).   7
optimality of the result does not imply optimality of the decisions that produce the 
result. However, Menger makes no particular hypothesis regarding the optimality or non 
optimality of pragmatic institutions, which are the result of a collective will and points 
to an “empirico realist” orientation of economic research and not an “exact” one. He 
believes however that an intervention on the evolution of organic institutions may be 
efficient and he attributes, for example, an important role to the State in regards to 
monetary regulation
21. Inversely, the supporters of the Austrian tradition have greatly 
linked the nature of institutions to their efficiency. This link seemed to have been 
outlined during the “debate on socialist computing” in which Mises and Hayek
22 
actively participated. The organic institutions are considered not only as being optimal, 
but also as the only ones that are. Pragmatic institutions are efficient inasmuch as they 
concern a small group of individuals and are related to organisations. As we will see 
later, this leads to a very “liberal” view of institutions. This conception is debatable 
inasmuch as its Hayekian foundations are also open to debate
23. The foundations that 
Mises has given are more solid because they are founded a priori and are much more 
difficult to debate. Buchanan (1989-90) or Vanberg (1996) have criticized this 
conception, Buchanan by considering that Hayek unduly extends his conception of the 
spontaneous order of the market to the underlying institutions (Buchanan, 1989-90, 
p.182). As for Vanberg, he shows that Menger and Hayek do not have the same way of 
perceiving institutions, the first devoted to explaining their methods of emergence while 
the second puts an accent on the nature of the underlying rules. Therefore, when these 
two approaches converge, we may show that these organic organisations can exist, as 
well as a pragmatic order can exist, while, for Hayek, the organisations are pragmatic 
and the orders are definitely organic. We will see in the second part that pragmatic 
institutions may be efficient and that organic institutions are, most susceptibly, not.   
 
                                                 
21 “On the other hand however, by state recognition and state regulation, this social institution of money 
has been perfected and adjusted to the manifold and varying needs of an evolving commerce, just as 
customary rights have been perfected and adjusted by statute law… The fixing of a coinage so as to 
include grades of value (Werstufen), and the establishment and maintenance of coined pieces so as to win 
the public confidence and, as far as possible, to forestall risk concerning their genuineness, weight, and 
fineness, and above all the ensuring their circulation in general, have been recognized everywhere as 
important functions of state administration.” (Menger, 1892, p. 255). 
22 For an in-depth analysis of Hayek’s commitment in this debate, cf. Bensaïd (2000). 
23 Cf. Ege (1992) or Garrouste (2001).   8
1.2. The principal Austrian contributions regarding the economic analysis of 
institutions. 
These contributions are numerous but the market and money constitute two 
institutions that are a central preoccupation of the Austrian authors. We will study them 
successively.  
 
1.2.1. The market as an institution. 
For the economists who support the Austrian tradition, the market constitutes the 
institution that is the foundation of the capitalist economy. It is the sine qua non 
conditions of the possibility of viewing individuals coordinate their plans for action. 
However, considerable variances exist between the Austrian authors. As we have 
recalled earlier, the Austrians try to explain the emergence of the market as an 
institution and at the same time they try to show that it is the only possible, or optimal, 
institution. The Austrian author most renowned for trying to analyze the emergence of 
the market and its optimal character is undisputedly Hayek
24. Through an evolutionist 
conception of society he shows how the archaic society, characterized by the 
implementation of concrete or conscious rules, was transformed into an open society 
that relies on the use of abstract rules. For Hayek, this evolution is necessary as of the 
moment the size of the society no longer allows to define or achieve the collective 
objectives. The development of the market is one expression of this evolution inasmuch 
as it makes possible a progressive adjustment process of individual action plans through 
a negative feed-back type mechanism. The large society produces a dual phenomenon 
that Dupuy (1992) identifies more precisely as that of a dual autonomy: “the autonomy 
of the modern individual otherwise released from all connection to traditional 
subordination, devoted to the State and to social totality. Social autonomy, which does 
not mean that people have control over society but completely the opposite, society has 
slipped out of their control and seems to have a life of its own, foreign even to those 
who are part of it.” (Dupuy, 1992, p. 247). This evolutionist view is not however 
without numerous problems.  
                                                 
24 For an analysis of the Hayekian conception of institutions based on an isomorphism with his 
conception of the human mind, cf: Rizzelo (1999).   9
The most devastating criticism is undoubtedly that of Ege (1992) when he believes that 
“either the “archaic society” is comprised of unconscious abstract rules, as in all other 
forms of human societies, or it is not yet a truly human society.” (Ege, 1992, p. 15). 
Another type of criticism insists on the difficulty of understanding the optimality of the 
open society by distinguishing between abstract and concrete rules (Garrouste, 2001). 
No matter the significance of the criticisms, the Hayekian analysis is no less than an 
attempt to reconcile an analysis of the emergence of the market as an institution and an 
evaluation of its efficiency.  
This view of uniqueness of an open society within the framework of 
spontaneous macro-order and that is greatly accepted by contemporary authors who 
support the Austrian tradition (par exemple Kirzner, 1973), is however brought into 
question by many “Austrians”, with Lachmann on the top of the list (1986)
25. 
“Entrepreneurs will encounter different circumstances on different markets. Due to this 
fact we must distinguish between the different markets.” (Lachmann, 1986, p. 116). 
In fact, Lachmann shows that the evolution of the markets is linked to an 
economic phenomenon of price reduction generated by the standardisation of products, 
which reduces the time necessary for price negotiation, and excludes consumers from 
the production process and confines them to a barter economy (Lachmann, 1986, 
p.122). Due to this they become “price-takers” and everything happens as though they 
are living in an economy of fixed prices while the entrepreneurs (especially the 
shumpeterian entrepreneurs) are “price-makers” and participate in an economy of 
flexible prices. On this basis, it is therefore possible to specify the markets according to 
their level of organisation and their location, their methods of negotiation and the more 
or less flexible character of the prices
26. In conclusion, it is necessary for Lachmann to 
study the evolutions differentiated from and on the various markets
27. 
The Austrian analysis of the market, and more generally of institutions is 
marked by an insufficiency: its difficulty to clearly define the relationships between 
voluntarily created institutions (pragmatic) and emerging institutions (organic), or 
concerning the market, its relationships with the organisations. It is only recently that 
                                                 
25 Cf. Arena, Festré (2001) and Gloria-Palermo(1999). 
26 Cf. Arena, Festré (2001). 
27 “In different markets, different classes of such agents confront each other, for example in asset and 
consumer goods markets. Hence the market processes engendered in such markets will be affected by 
these differences.” (Lachmann, 1986, p. 122).   10
the conceptions of the firm and not only the entrepreneur have been proposed by the 
Austrian and neo-Austrian authors (Lewin, Phelan, 2000, Iaonnides, 1999, Klein, 1996, 
Foss, 1994), for example the conception that renders organic institutions (the market) 
and pragmatic institutions (organisations) as two complementary realities, and not 
concurrent as they are often perceived (Dulbecco, Garrouste, 2000). Such an 




Menger’s theses regarding the problem of the emergence of money, strictly 
speaking, were not very extensive in terms of the works relating to the necessity (or not) 
of managing this institution. The debates regarding “free-banking” and the monetary 
“laissez-faire” are but one example. However a few works exists that have tried to 
evaluate Menger’s theses. They are all the more interesting as they are in tune with 
certain works that we will present in the second part. Jones (1976) applies a model very 
similar to the search models to analyze the origin and the development of money, from a 
Mengerian point of view
28. He shows that from hypotheses, some of which have strayed 
away from the Mengerian approach
29, a barter method appears. From a different 
approach, Klein and Selgin (2000) believe it is possible to make money emerge by 
using a “Polya Urn” type model. They show that the emergence of a general equivalent 
is the result of a non-ergodic process, in other words, depending on the path. Finally, 
Alvarez (2001), and we refer to elements of our second part, shows that by using the 
works of Wright (1995), Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and Iwai (1996) there exists many 
possible balances, that the merchandise that is to become money does not necessarily 
have the best trading qualities and therefore the expectations of individuals with regard 
to this merchandise are essential.  
The other important research field concerning money as an institution relates to 
its organisation. Numerous Austrians, following Hayek, have insisted on the fact that 
money should not have been administered. This literature is abundant. For example, 
                                                 
28 In fact it resolves only one of the problems. “How have certain commodities come to be exalted into 
general media of exchange?” (Jones, 1976, p. 750). He does not show that there it could be profitable to 
use money instead of the barter.  
29 For example, the fact that prices are fixed while in a Mengerian point of view, they are the result of a 
negotiation.   11
Selgin and White (1994) try to show that the monetary “laissez-faire” is the best way to 
avoid the malfunctions that its administration may cause.  
 
2. Economic analysis of institutions and their connection to the Austrian tradition. 
It may seem strange to want to make the Austrians prevalent, contemporary 
leaders in matters of economic analysis of institutions
30. We will try to defend this point 
of view by starting with a few quotes.  
“Our conception of the role of economics in social science is very close to Menger’s, 
and it is on this conception that we will base our definition of economics as the study of 
how individual economic agents pursuing their own selfish ends evolve institutions as a 
means to satisfy them.” (Schotter, 1981, p. 5). He defines institutions as “regularities” of 
behaviour that are accepted by all the members of a society and that specify the 
behaviours in specific recurring situations.” (idem, p. 9)
31. 
“The notion that economic institutions and patterns of behaviour can be explained as the 
product or outcome of many individual decisions is scarcely a new idea in economics. It 
is perhaps most prominently associated with members of the Austrian school, notably 
Menger, von Hayek, and Schumpeter.” (Young, 1998, p. 4)
32. 
“No one has characterized market mechanisms better than Friedrich von Hayek.” 
(Simon, 1981, p. 41). 
“Hayek’s discussion of the rational economic order is of interest in several respects.” 
(Williamson, 1975, p. 4).  
These few quotes show the importance of the Austrian explanation for the emergence 
and evolution of institutions. 
                                                 
30 We will not presume here to make a comprehensive presentation of these prevailing matters and if the 
criticisms made by Bernard Walliser about his kaleidoscopic character may be justified, it does not seem 
necessary to question the basis for our reasoning.  
31 He distinguishes social institutions from social conventions as Lewis does, that are “self-policing”, 
while the social institutions may require the intervention of an outside authority to ensure respect. 
32 He adds, “though elements of the approach are implicit in the writings of earlier authors, including 
Adam Smith, David Hume, and Edmund Burke”.   12
Beyond these quotes, we may consider that the proximity between certain recent 
analyses of institutions, if founded, may be so based on taking into account the 
behavioural hypotheses, the evolutionary processes and the problem of efficiency of the 
institutions. 
 
2.1. Behavioural hypotheses. 
Contemporary works regarding institutions are all or almost all based on an 
analysis of individual behaviours that integrate the fact that their rationality is limited
33. 
With regard to the Austrian tradition we must however note two elements. On the one 
hand, these analyses try to define the individual rationality in such a manner so as to 
permit a formalisation of the behaviours
34, that can be justified by the will to obtain 
testable propositions, and on the other hand, they are not all based on a distinction 
between information and knowledge.  
The most widely known conception of rationality that is close to the Austrian 
viewpoint is that proposed by Simon through concepts of “limited rationality” and 
“procedural rationality”. The first of these two concepts was quickly integrated by 
economists while the second, having a dynamic connotation, took longer to circulate. 
To show the interest of this concept, you need only take into account the numerous 
works that have shown the importance. Williamson made, with opportunism, one of the 
two behavioural hypotheses on which the Transaction Costs Theory was constructed
35. 
The works of Rubinstein (1998) develop the different models that can be proposed 
through this idea that individuals are limited with regards to their rationality and 
Conlisk (1996) lists the works that justify and illustrate this limited character. It seems 
that the most developed analysis regarding the rationality of economic agents is thanks 
to Walliser (1996) who specifies two forms of rationality (instrumental and cognitive) 
and is interested, on the one hand, in the consequences of a reduction in the perfection 
                                                 
33 We are not considering making a summary on the concept of rationality in economics, a summary that, 
to our knowledge, does not seem to exist.  We are content with presenting a few solutions that were found 
in regards to this problem and relating to our subject at hand.  
34 Cf. the introduction of Kirman, Salmon (1995). 
35 We may think that one of the explanations of the static character of the Williamson theory comes from 
the fact that he borrows only Simon’s concept of limited rationality.   13
of these two forms with regard to coordination
36 processes and on the other hand, in the 
definitions of the training they imply.  
In fact, the manner in which the problem of limited rationality is treated, is to 
propose a unique and general definition of this concept or to define it in a more or less 
ad hoc manner, which is not in itself debatable but no longer allows obtaining a general 
model, only local models
37 with their pertinence being conditioned by the definition of 
rationality that is proposed. Therefore Young (1998), in order to give content to this 
concept presumes 1) that the agents may not choose the best response to the strategy of 
others, 2) to have only a limited memory of all the past actions and 3) to take into 
account the strategies of only part of the population. Orléan (1998) proposes a solution 
that is very similar to that of Menger by considering a population divided in two: one 
sub-population who is informed and reacts accordingly, in other words on the basis of 
the signals they receive from their economic environment, and another sub-population 
that imitates the latter. Yates (2000), in order to model the market process through a 
Kirznerian viewpoint, also considers two types of entrepreneurs, one type being the 
“standard vendors” who consider having a complete decision model and request a price 
equal to the median price and the second type, the “entrepreneurial vendors” who 
believe their decision model is incomplete and remain attentive to the information that 
may be relayed to them.  These entrepreneurs are supposed to make negative or positive 
corrections with regard to the actual market price. 
Kirman (1999) emphasizes the heterogeneity of individuals on a market by 
proposing an objective function based on simultaneous benefits of past trading 
experiences and on a parameter displaying the fidelity of the buyers to the same 
vendors. 
All these hypotheses made in regard to individual behaviours are concerned, in a 
comparative viewpoint that we share, on the one hand with moving closer to the 
Austrian conception and on the other hand, with allowing the production of testable 
models. 
 
                                                 
36 Cf. also the axiomatics proposed by the Bayesian revision of Walliser, Zwirn (2000) 
37 “Part of the attraction of the highly rational models is the idea that there may be many ways to be less 
than rational, but only one (or in the light of the equilibrium refinement literature perhaps only few ways) 
of being highly rational.” ( Erev, Roth, 1998, p. 848).   14
2.2. The evolutionary process. 
  Menger does not really specify the process by which individuals are able to 
coordinate their actions to obtain an optimal result. As well as per the writings of 
Schotter (1992), we must wait for the appearance of the game theory for this intuition to 
be formalised. However many types of solutions have been proposed and some are not 
related to the development of the game theory. In any case, the idea of analyzing the 
interactions between individuals and the results of these interactions is typically the 
object of this theory and it is not a coincidence if there is an Austrian name associated to 
its creation
38. 
   More recently, the first writings in the field of evolutionary games have shown 
the pertinence of the Hayekian intuition. In fact, these models are not part of any 
particular hypothesis regarding rationality since population models have yet to be 
constructed. Only the implementation of a stable evolutionary strategy, no matter what 
the reason for this “choice” of strategy, assures the sustainability of the population who 
implements it. In other words, the individuals do not deliberate on which strategy is the 
best one to follow. This approach is very Hayekian in the sense that Hayek (1990) 
proposes an evolutionist explanation for the development of the open society, based on 
a group selection.  The abstract rules are selected without the knowledge of the 
individuals, which means that the emergence of an order may be similar to the selection 
of a stable evolutionary strategy. 
This type of model has been criticized, by Young (1998) among others, who 
opposed a solution based on a concept of a stable stochastical strategy, in other words 
resistant not only to a single shock (invasion by another strategy) but also to recurring 
shocks. The idea comes from the “fictitious play” type of model, “disrupting” it by 
introducing three parameters: a probability of not giving the right response, a limited 
memory and the size of the population taken into account by the individual in order to 
define the frequency of other individual’s strategies. 
                                                 
38 We will not discuss here the history of the game theory (cf. Weintraub, 1992) nor its methodological 
characteristics (cf. regarding this point - Schmidt (2001)).   15
The technological competition models of Arthur, retaken by David (2001) have 
shown that multiple balances may result from a non ergodic process of the “urnes 
polya” type and that these solutions are dependant on the initial conditions and smaller 
events (or stochastic shocks).   
Finally from a different viewpoint, Bonini and Egidi (1999) build a dynamic 
model based on the works of Kaufman to show that going from a given solution to a 
global optimal solution, taking into account the amount k of interdependencies in the 
elements N of a system, passing through local sub-optimal balances, is impossible. In 
other words, the local sub-optimal balance may be stable. 
 
2.3. Efficiency of institutions. 
It is regarding this point that the contemporary works are most distinguished 
from the Austrian analysis of institutions. Some put the accent on the fact that organic 
institutions may not be efficient, in other words they are sub-optimal. As we use non 
deterministic dynamic models, it is possible to obtain multiple, non optimal results.  The 
non ergodic element that characterizes the “path-dependent” process allows us to obtain 
different paths from identical initial situations, paths that do not converge towards a 
unique absorbent state. This phenomenon is important as it does not assure the 
optimality of organic institutions. The solution chosen, in other words, selected as a 
result of an evolutionary process, is not necessarily the best. The writings regarding the 
choice of standard (David, 2001) indicate such a possibility.  
In similar fashion, we may obtain local sub-optimal solutions by using landscape 
models as per Kaufman where we define a number k of interdependencies between 
elements N (genes according to Kaufman). Egidi and Bonini (1999) therefore show that 
the number of mutations necessary to routinely pass from a sub-optimal solution to an 
optimal solution is linked to the value k. Egidi (2000) however emphasizes a counter-
example by obtaining the transformation of a non optimal solution to an optimal 
solution with a mutation of k>1. 
Young (1998) shows that if we disturb a regular process of Markov then it 
supposes at least a stable stochastical balance. This points out that the disturbed 
dynamic system is not cyclic and it converges towards a final state within a definite 
number of periods. The absorbent states of the process are defined as conventions, in   16
other words states corresponding to balances as per Nash for a game, G, to n 
individuals, when we define an adaptive training by introducing the parameters for 
probability of error, of limited memory and of the size of the referenced population. 
This being so, there is nothing that can assure that the convention is Pareto-optimal. 
 
Conclusion. 
We have tried to show in this article that the analysis of institutions proposed by 
Menger did not only lead to extensions within the only Austrian School but that a 
certain number of basics of the Mengerian intuition, to use Schotter’s terms, were 
reviewed and developed through certain economic analyses of contemporary 
institutions, with results that were sometimes more conclusive that those of the 
“Austrian” authors. 
   17
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